

**NO IDENTITY CARDS
OR NUMBERS**

NO!

NO!!

NO!!!

NO!!!

NO!!!



**A brief explanation from
PEOPLE AGAINST IDENTITY NUMBERS**

Many thanks to the following organizations for their support or financial donations:

Action Resources Centre

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Campaign Against Poverty and Unemployment

Brunswick Unemployment Group

Collingwood CYSS

Federation of Victorian Legal Centres

Community Resource Action Centres

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This booklet has been produced by the **People Against Identity Numbers**.

We can be contacted at: 49 Peel St, West Melbourne, Victoria 3003, or you can ring us on (03) 328 4988.

You may copy any part of this publication, take pages out, quote it wherever you like — in fact — please do everything you can to get those around you to think through the issues. We must not allow any Government in this country to introduce ID Cards and numbers under any pretext.

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Chapter 1

How the Campaign Against Identity Numbers Began

In June 1985 the Australian Government released a White Paper detailing possible reforms to the Australian taxation system. The Paper suggested \$800 million of lost tax revenue could be saved if a National Identification System was introduced into Australia. Although the White Paper was very short on specifics, a proposal for an ID system was included in Option 'A' of the tax package the Government prepared for the Tax Summit held in July 1985.

Unfortunately, in the kerfuffle that followed the Government's heavy-handed attempts to introduce an across-the-board consumption tax, the ID Card proposal received little attention. At least one speaker at the summit felt unable to give any view on the issue because the proposal was so vague, notwithstanding the production by Dr Blewett of a glossy green and gold booklet that supposedly explained how an ID Card system would work.

No media attention was given to the quite vocal and significant opposition to ID Cards that was voiced at the People's Tax Summit, which was held near the Government's Tax Summit. This set the pattern for what has followed.

Worried by the failure of the media to alert the Australian public to the danger it was facing, a number of groups including the Coalition Against Poverty and Unemployment, the Federation of Victorian Legal Centres and the Victorian Council for Civil Liberties, called a public meeting in Melbourne on 2 August 1985. Despite inclement weather, approximately 300 people attended and overwhelmingly passed motions condemning the ID Card proposal and calling for all possible resistance to the proposal. Notice of a campaign planning meeting was given at the public meeting.

On 7 August 1985, People Against Identification Numbers (PAIN) was formed to oppose the introduction of ID Cards and numbers into Australia. In

marked contrast to the hundreds of thousands of dollars the Government has illegally spent spreading propaganda supporting its ephemeral ID Cards proposal, PAIN has limped along on the donations of time and money it has received from interested individuals and groups. Within the constraints imposed by its limited resources, PAIN has attempted to lobby for political support for its cause and to stimulate the widest possible public discussion of the ID Card and number proposal.

The need for this discussion becomes increasingly obvious as time goes on. For instance, this booklet contains a very rudimentary analysis of the tax arguments put forward by the Government since June this year. (Unfortunately reasons of space, and thus cost, prevented the inclusion of a more detailed analysis.) Yet despite the basic nature of our analysis, it is still a far more detailed analysis than any that has appeared in any of the organs of the Australian media to date.

PAIN operates from the offices of the Coalition Against Poverty and Unemployment at:

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This booklet is designed to stimulate discussion. To this end, we would be grateful if you could pass it on to your family and friends once you have read it and discuss the issues it raises wherever and whenever possible. We remind you that it is not our generation which will suffer the most from the introduction of ID Cards and numbers — it will probably be our children and grand-children who will really suffer.

"What did you do in 1985 to stop IDs?" may well become the question most frequently asked of those of us who survive into the 21st Century. What will your answer be?

Chapter 2

ID Cards — The Myths and Realities . . .

Since the Government started to sell the ID Card proposal, four main points have been 'sold' to the Australian public that we consider to be dangerous myths that need to be put into proper perspective. Certain sections of the media have promoted ID Cards by saying that:

1. ID Cards are the same as credit cards and drivers licences;
 2. ID Cards will only be used by a few Government departments;
 3. Honest people have nothing to fear from ID Cards;
 4. ID Cards will save the Government money.
- your finances (the state of your bank account and your credit rating)
 - your addresses
 - who you telephone and who has been telephoning you
 - any contact you have with the police (however innocent)
 - your school records and reports
 - your health records and 'personal problems'
 - your tax returns
 - books you have read
 - employment and unemployment records.

1. ID Cards are the Same as Credit Cards . . .

ID Cards are **not** the same as credit cards and driving licences. Their uses will be as different as you can imagine. Driving licences allow individuals to drive a car — there is no law that says we must all have the ability to drive. We do not have to have credit cards either (well, for some of us there is no other way of raising money, but that is an economic argument more suitable for another publication).

Whereas we hold most of our existing cards (library, licence, kidney donor, Bankcard, etc) by choice and know exactly what they are used for, the ID Card is something else. It will be unique.

Possible Uses of the Card

No-one knows exactly how this Card will be used. We will not be able to apply to have one, or choose not to have one. We do know that the Card will give us a number. It is the number that will allow the Government to identify us as an individual.

Once the Government has given each Australian a number, any record of any part of our lives can be recorded and 'attached' to the number. As Government departments and companies (such as banks) become computerized, the information can be pulled together. Computers can 'talk' to each other and, given time, the ID Card number could give information on:

Presently, the information you choose to give the Road Traffic Authority (RTA) is used by them and the police.

The same applies to the information you may choose to give your library, video hire shop or the doctor. If we are 'given' a personal identification number we already know that the Government departments of Immigration, Taxation, Social Security, Health, the Electoral Commission, the Australian Federal Police, Foreign Affairs and Veteran's Affairs will all be sharing their information. This 'networking' will be possible when each person has an identification number.

The most worrying point about the ID Cards is that we will not know which departments are networking, what information is being 'shared' between them, how the information will be used, when it will be used and, most importantly, will it even be 'correct'?

2. The ID Cards will only be used by a few Government departments

Name, sex, date of birth, address and identifying number . . . is all the information which would be included in the Australia Card Register.

Dr N Blewett

Apparently you can, if you wish, also include blood group details, next of kin, family doctor and special medical problems. It all sounds very harmless, but compare this quote from Dr Blewett with comments made by the Health Insurance Commission. It made the original report on the feasibility and establishment of the system. In its paper, the Commission discussed the ways in which both the number of departments having access to the system and the information contained in the Register could be extended:

It will be important to minimize any adverse public reaction to implementation of the system . . . One possibility would be to use a staged approach for implementation whereby only less sensitive data are held in the system initially with the facility to input additional data at a later stage when public acceptance may be forthcoming more readily.

And this:

. . . it is expected that participant agencies would include Medicare, Australian Taxation Office . . . and **any** other authorities with data suitable for inclusion in the system.

Given the argument that there is a positive correlation between the amount of information, the extent of access to that information and the potential for abuse and denial of civil liberties in Australia, Dr Blewett's comforting assurances seem to fade when placed in the context of the public service's snow job approach. Consider also this comment by Mr Jim Carlton, Liberal MHR:

Ninety-five per cent of Cabinet submissions I saw during my time as a minister called for extension of power and influence of the bureaucracy, and, as a necessary consequence, for the progressive reduction of individual choice or personal liberty . . . I see no reason why this would not apply to a national identification system.

And if that's not a worry, consider the ways in which private bodies could utilize the system upon expansion. In Sweden, where there is a similar, but not as extensive a system as the proposed Australia Card, advertising companies have gained access to personal information in order to send letters to individuals to remind them of wedding anniversaries and the like. The NSW Privacy Committee claims that:

The identification number could become a key to discovering a great deal about the likes, dislikes and lifestyles of an individual. This would allow, for example, more personalized sales pitches and solicitations.

3. Honest people have nothing to fear

Honest people have to fear the day they lose, misplace or have their card stolen. Producing your card on 'demand' will become the 'norm'. Not having one will lead the police — or whoever happens to be demanding to see your card — to presume that you have something to hide. Dr Blewett has said that the card would not be used in this way. We believe that the cards **will** be used as an internal passport and that there will be no way to stop this use. The Federal Police and the Department of the Special Minister of State have supported our view by saying:

. . . it should be noted that any offences attracted by the non-prescribed uses would largely be unenforceable.

What this means is that anyone from the police to your landlord will be able to demand to see your ID Card without fear of punishment.

Children in Victorian schools have had their prints taken by the police on the pretext that 'should a child be lost, the found child can be identified'. Those prints will remain on the police files for the life of the child. Similar excuses will be used when the police ask if they can automatically tap telephones, place cameras in our homes and have the right of entry to any property. Of course, honest people have nothing to fear from such intrusions into their lives.

Remember when they launched Medicare and the Government gave public assurances that the Medicare Cards would not be used as a future data base for a national identity card? Our rights of privacy are every day being whittled away and each measure brings a political promise of limited use.

Mr Justice Michael Kirby stated that:

What is at stake is nothing less than the nature of our society and the power and authority of the state in relation to the individual. Until now the state and its agencies cannot intervene in our lives without a lawful and reasonable excuse to do so. The danger of the new surveillance is that this will change.

4. ID Cards Will Save the Government Money

The most pervasive myth concerning ID Cards is that they will save the Government money. While it may be true that the Government might begin to show a net profit from the ID Cards in about 1994 (and this is based on the Government's estimates, not ours), this ignores the fact that the Government can show net profits **and** reduce the same forms of tax evasion that ID Cards are aimed at in **1986** by using other methods which pose no threat to civil liberties. It seems strange that the Government should be prepared to spend over \$640 million and wait for nine years before the investment will begin to show a single dollar of profit. And what a profit! All going well, by the late 1990s the Government will be saving about \$8 per person per year!

When the haze produced by the Government's propaganda is dispersed, the harsh fact remains that ID Cards can only ever hope to tackle two forms of tax evasion:

1. undeclared dividend and interest income; and
2. PAYE losses caused by people working in two jobs under different names and taking advantage of two tax thresholds.

Losses in relation to dividends and interest are chiefly caused by the inability of the Tax Office to use the information it receives from companies and banks. Using an ID Card system to solve this problem can be compared with using a jackhammer to crack open a nut. Much cheaper alternatives exist.

With respect to losses caused by people working in two jobs under a different name, the Government estimates that ID Cards will eventually save it \$50 million per year. Remember, by the time that these savings are achieved, the Government predicts the ID Card system will cost about \$100 million per year to run.

Chapter 3

ID Cards and the Overseas Experience

Canada:

Canada introduced a Social Insurance Number (SIN) in 1936 with the assurance that it would only be used to assist in the administration of an unemployment insurance scheme, (sound familiar?).

Despite this assurance of the SIN's limited applicability, 1965 saw the system extend to tax collection and pension distribution. Since 1965 there have been further legislative moves to increase the number of departments and other bodies that may have access to the social insurance information.

The Canadian Privacy Commissioner prepared a report on the use of the Social Insurance Number in 1981. This report detailed the extent to which the scheme had been extended in its use by both public and private bodies. The report noted that the use of the number had not at any stage

been restricted by legislation. There is no law prohibiting either the public or the private sector from asking a person for his/her SIN and there is no law to prohibit the denial of goods or services to those people who do not present their SIN. As a result of these legislative extensions and shortcomings, Canadians today need to quote their SIN when they: apply for union membership; renew magazine subscriptions; borrow library books and to apply to hunt wild geese.

United States:

The US has had a Social Security Number (SSN) since 1936. Again, this was introduced for a single purpose and was only required of employees contributing to social security and unemployment compensation schemes. However, by 1974 its use was required for such a large number of trans-

actions that legislation was introduced to check its use by government departments. The US Government by this stage could not hope to check the use made of the SSN by private organizations. It had to content itself with attempting to control government use of the number.

A US Federal Advisory Committee on false identification argued against the introduction of a national ID card:

If such a system were implemented . . . it would be subject to defeat by imposters or counterfeiters taking advantage of careless inspection of documents or through corruption of officials . . . organized crime would take advantage of the presumption of validity surrounding such a large system. Criminals could receive benefits far greater than they obtain under the current multi-faceted system of identification.

The US also provides an almost endless list of examples of how the SSN has been misused. One American was detained for five months by military authorities because of an error in a computer file recorded him as absent without leave, despite the fact that he'd been discharged from service eleven years earlier! In another case, a woman, when trying to discover the reason for her failure to secure employment in the public service, found that she'd been knocked back because of comments from a former school teacher who had claimed in school records that, in her opinion, the woman's mother was crazy.

Although the SSN is not regarded as a high security number, it is not handed out over the counter to whoever wants one; there is a system of safeguards. More secure safeguards are possible, but at a much greater cost. Nevertheless, a

US Government committee discovered in 1973 that 4.2 million American have two or more SSNs, and that one particular number was used by more than 5,000 people.

Despite the SSN's operation, it is estimated that the US black economy is approximately \$US 100 billion per year. This is almost as much as the Australian Government's annual expenditure.

Sweden:

Sweden has used a system of population registration for hundreds of years and a personal ID number since 1947. The Swedish ID system is probably the most thorough in the western world, yet Sweden also has a flourishing cash economy (estimated to be approximately 20% of current government revenue, or \$US 3.5 - 5.5 billion), not to mention a flourishing barter system. Sweden is also the only country to have attempted to link all government-held data relating to individuals (eg, school, health, tax, police records) to a single ID number or UPI. However, after this system had been in operation for a few years, the government was forced, by overwhelming public pressure, to move back to its original system. Notwithstanding their years of conditioning to ID cards and numbers, even the Swedes found a UPI system too intrusive of their privacy.

Chapter 4

ID Cards and Social Security

When tax reform became a prominent issue in early 1985, both the government and the media were frothing at the mouth about white-collar tax evasion. However, since the Tax Summit, the focus of blame for loss of government revenue has shifted from the white-collar sector to the 'social security cheats'. The ID Card proposal is being offered as the mechanism to get these 'significant participants' in the evasion game.

The public's legitimate concern with tax evasion and avoidance is distorted by laying the blame for this problem at the feet of the most disadvantaged members of the community. It is, or it should be, a well known fact that surviving solely on government pensions or benefits is virtually impossible (remember Mr Lusher, MP). The level of assistance is already well below the austere poverty line established by the Henderson Poverty Enquiry.



Statistics show that people living on welfare benefits over time either have to spend their savings, sell their assets or go into debt. If they take 'legitimate' work using their own name and declaring their income to the Department of Social Security, they encounter effective marginal tax rates that exceed 50%. This is well above the rates usually applied to corporate and personal income tax categories.

■ For Example:

A single supporting parent with one child receives a pension of \$118.30 per week. Any income over \$36 per week results in a 50¢ loss of benefit for every additional dollar earned and, in addition to this, with the impact of taxation, income over \$66 attracts a marginal tax rate of 62.5%. According to the Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, it costs a single parent an additional \$22.80 per week for transport, clothing, etc, just to be in the workforce. This does not include childcare costs. Supplementary rent assistance of up to \$15 per week is forfeited when a pensioner's earnings reach \$6 per week. All this on an income that doesn't attain the \$172.50 per week which is the poverty line for a single parent with one dependent.

This process is appropriately known as a 'poverty trap'

The effect of these restrictions on allowable earnings is that many pensioners and beneficiaries are forced into the underground labour market, where earnings are not declared. People in this position are easy prey for less scrupulous employers who may pay under-award wages in exchange for non-declaration of employment. These part-time workers, because of their anonymity or false identity, are effectively locked out of the union movement and denied those benefits of legislation that are designed to protect workers

from dangerous and exploitative working conditions.

Most single parents are women, as are most social security consumers.

Comments by Frank Hardy sum the situation up well:

Surprise! Surprise! Women are likely to be harder hit than men by the ID Card racket. Bloody near half the kids in Australia are being brought up by women on their own: 800,000 of their kids are living below the poverty line, in spite of that fact, some of the mothers do a little part-time work in the 'cash-economy'. Enough said.

It is useful at this point to note that many women living in refuges rely on anonymity or false identities to protect themselves and their children from domestic violence. The formality and comprehensiveness of the ID Card system will leave many women in danger, bereft of the anonymity that in many ways is their **only** claim to security.

Regardless of the change in emphasis from the white-collar sector to the poor in the community; it is even doubtful that the scheme can tackle the minimal 2% of the Department of Social Security (DSS) 'overpayments' caused by the use of false identities. In its submission to Cabinet, the DSS claimed that the scheme would not be effective in reducing social security fraud, would be too costly, intrusive of the privacy of their consumers and would be open to fraudulent cards extending the potential for abuse of the social security system.

ID Cards are not the answer to either tax evasion or poverty. The Government must apply itself to increasing employment opportunities, raising the base rates of social security payments, the level of allowable earnings and thereby removing the poverty traps in the present system. This would be more positive than focusing public condemnation on the victims of a system that has forced them to 'cheat' in order to survive.

Chapter 5

Something is Still Rotten (An Analysis of the Government's Tax Arguments)

The Government's chief justification for the introduction of a system of ID Cards was the amount of tax evasion it could prevent. Unfortunately, all its attempts to substantiate this reveals how ill-thought out its arguments have been

Revenue estimates

At the time of the tax summit, the Government estimated tax savings at **\$800 million** after three years, made up as follows:

- non-declaration of dividend and interest income; (\$300-\$500 million)
- non-declaration of rental income; (\$300 million)
- unreported wage and salary income; (\$100 million)

However, after it was pointed out that unreported wage and salary income losses were chiefly the fault of employers failing to deduct PAYE instalments from wages, and that ID Cards could not possibly save significant amounts of tax in the rental area, the Government was quickly forced to revise its estimates. The second set of revenue estimates were made up as follows:

- non-declaration of dividend and interest income; (\$225-\$350 million)
- PAYE income; (\$72 million)
- under-statement of business income; (\$540 million)

The new 'savings' total was **\$902.5 million** (ie the median figure of the range \$840 million and \$965 million). However, the fact that the amount changed, and that the way it was calculated had completely changed was not widely publicized. Small wonder!

In an analysis of these estimates in a paper by PAIN entitled *Something is Rotten in the State of Australia*, it was pointed out that cheaper and more effective methods were available to the Government in the area of dividends and interest;

that the \$75 million PAYE figure was a 'bit optimistic'; and that the \$540 figure for business income totally lacked any foundation and appeared to have been plucked from thin air.

These comments were borne out when the Government released yet another set of revenue estimates on 19 September 1985, showing likely savings of **\$540 million** (after **7 years** ie in 1992-93). This time the figures looked like this:

- salary and wages; (\$50 million)
- dividends and interest; (\$160 million)
- business taxpayers; (\$330 million)

A more detailed break-up was given of the \$330 million relating to business taxpayers. This makes it obvious that the 'Australia Card' will not bring in any money in this area; all the savings would result from changes in procedures in the Tax Office (as recommended by the Auditor General earlier this year).

Yet the Government has stated:

the expected revenue gains are lower than the \$800 million originally envisaged as a result of the non-inclusion of a photograph on the Card and also because the estimated gains are now based on the proposed new rate scales.

As the savings for wages, salaries, dividends and interest chiefly depend on employers, banks and companies making a record of an ID Number, rather than sighting an ID Card (for example, can you imagine shareholders having to collect dividends personally so they can show their Cards?), it is difficult to see how the loss of the photo can have such a dramatic effect, given that the new rate scales cannot have caused much of the change. How does the loss of the photo enable the elimination of the interest range given in the earlier estimates? Again it is obvious that the Government does not know what it is talking about, or that it is deliberately attempting to deceive the public.

The Government still refuses to look at the cheaper and more effective methods available to



reduce tax evasion in the wage, salary, interest and dividends areas. A withholding tax system similar to the PAYE system is perfectly feasible for interest and dividend payments. It would involve less cost and bother than the BAD and FID taxes, and would create immediate savings for the Government. Alternatively, a system whereby interest and dividend payments had to be credited to a tax file number would achieve a similar result. Such a system for wage and salary payments would also be a cheaper method of collecting more tax more quickly than an ID Card system.

Costs

The Government's estimates of the costs of the ID Card system have also been subject to massive fluctuations. The initial estimates given by the Government were **\$38 million** to establish the system, and **\$49 million** annual running costs. In its paper *Something is Rotten*, PAIN stated that when the real costs were added up 'establishment costs are likely to be astronomical'. Within a few weeks, the Government had released new cost estimates stating that the establishment cost would be about **\$228 million**, with annual running costs of **\$85 million**.

The estimates released by the Government on 19 September 1985 are for establishment costs of **\$127 million**, annual running costs of **\$86 million** for the seven years up to 1992-93:

... stabilising at around something under \$100 million per annum thereafter.

It is interesting how running costs became higher after the photograph was dropped from the Card.

What it All Means

With the ID Card proposal, the Government is attempting to foist onto the Australian public a system which is more expensive and less effective than a number of alternatives. On its own figures, the Government admits that it will take until 1993 before it saves a single net dollar of tax revenue and by the late 1990s it will be saving about **\$8 dollars per Australian per year**. But then, have you ever known a Government cost estimate to be less than, or equal to, the original estimate? After all, it only took four months this year for revenue estimates to fall by almost \$600 million.

Chapter 6

ID Cards and Computer Abuse

The setting up of a system of ID Cards or numbers would also see the setting up by government of centralized computer data banks containing much information about every Australian. Three areas of concern arise when every significant and many not so significant events are brought together in the one place: how the information is obtained; how the information is used; and who has access to the information.

How the Information is Obtained

Much of the information that will appear on your file will not be directly obtained from you. Records of transactions and reports compiled about you, and information supplied by third parties, will make up the bulk of your file.

Unknown mistakes: You won't be able to find out if a mistake has been made in your file unless you make periodic and cumbersome requests under the *Freedom of Information Act*.

Hearsay: Studies in Canada and the US show that people who write reports on individuals for governments, often rely on hearsay to save time, often express opinions they were unqualified to give, and even put in false information out of malice.

Keyboard error: Errors can be made when information is transferred from one file to another. Recently a US Army clerk ordered a battery, item 9734, and received an eight tonne anchor, item 9634, even though he was hundreds of miles from the sea, no-one questioned the mistake..

Outdated material: The size of an individual's file will prevent it from being quickly updated. In New York a man had been knocked back from countless jobs before he discovered that his file showed that he had been charged with robbery. The file had not been updated to show that the charge had been dismissed.

Information pruned: Because of input costs, it is usual to prune material that goes into a central file,

so that only highlights or conclusions are retained from the source. A conclusion which can be seen to be wrong in a report takes on a different character if it appears by itself.

Why the worry: Even now mistakes are inevitable. However, a mistake in your Medicare file, for instance, won't affect you when you apply for a job. If all the information is gathered onto one file, and a mistake says that you have a heart condition, you may miss out on a job or a car licence without even knowing the reason why. Or if you do have a mild heart condition, then this could rule you out for superannuation reasons.

Past mistakes: If you committed some minor crime or other indiscretion while you were young, that information would follow you to the grave and you may be paying for it for the rest of your life.

How the Information is Used

It's not the number that's the evil, and it's not the information that's evil; it's the decision to collect and use the information.

Hope Eastman, ACCL

Information is power: Information has a market value. It can be bought, sold, stolen or traded for other data. It can be used in ways for which it was never intended, and can be misused.

Specialist knowledge required: Often a file from a particular source will use specialized language. A student may fail to sit an exam, but that information in the record, eg, 'O (ABS)', might lead a public servant to think the student failed.

Loss of dignity: Information is power in negotiations, so you will be at a disadvantage every time you have dealings with someone who has access to your file. Public servants usually hold the advantage as it is, but if they know personal details, it will be difficult to retain even a modicum of dignity. This would be far worse if these public servants were police.

Means of control: Centralized information is a mechanism of social control. To quote Hope Eastman again:

... the more information they have, the less creative, less adventurous, less politically active you are for fear of offending someone.

It also enables a government to keep track of where you are and where you have been.

Commercial uses: It is not overly difficult to obtain unauthorized access to government files using a personal computer, or by bribing a public servant. The uses to which such information may be put are limited only by one's imagination.

Machine breakdowns: It is bad enough when a computer holding your bank account details breaks down, but when the computer holding all your details is not working, you might as well stay in bed. If a power failure occurs at the wrong time and someone forgot to make a backup file, you might find yourself without a file — a non-person. The inconvenience this could cause before it is remedied borders on the catastrophic.

Guilty until proven innocent: Experience has shown that as more reliance comes to be placed on those systems. As one looks at information information to be unquestioned as it emerges from those systems. As one looks at information neatly presented in a consistent way, one tends to forget where the information came from, eg, 'a grime-besmirched time sheet filled in with a stub of pencil and a tongue in cheek'. Thus, information emerging from computers tends to be relied upon as portraying the 'real' you, until and unless you can show otherwise.

Who has access to the information:

Information held on a computer cannot be protected from someone determined to gain access to it. Home computer users have even been able to access Pentagon war plans with 'ultra' restricted access. Centralized government data banks will be fair game for hobby computer users. At the lower end of the scale, hobbyists may be content simply to gain access and to look at the files of people they know. Computer experts believe that a group of children in the US probably knew that President Reagan had cancer before the President himself knew, as they gained entry to the data banks where the President's records were kept.

Blackmail: Computer hobbyists may choose to collect data which they can sell. There is evidence that even our Department of Social Security has had information collected and sold.

Vandalism: They may alter or delete information out of malice, for reward or by accident.

Undetectable: It would be virtually impossible to detect the penetration of a national identification system, and there is no reason why unauthorized access could not continue:

... for years without detection with information being sold to interested buyers (perhaps including organized crime).

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility

Chapter 7

ID Cards and Social Control

When the Nazis invaded the Netherlands in 1940, the first thing they did was to establish a system of identity papers for Dutch citizens. Most of the countries they invaded spared them this bother — they already had such systems in place. With the help of identity papers (and more importantly the information that was collected from the system) the Nazis were able to eliminate 90% of the Dutch Jewish population.

Keeping Tabs

Totalitarian systems cannot function effectively without a means of controlling the movements of their members and without a means of 'keeping tabs' on the activities of persons within the system who are likely to be a danger to it. The socialist countries are an excellent example of this today. The cheapest and most effective means of control

of a population is a system of internal passports. For instance, the average person living in Moscow cannot visit Leningrad without first getting what is effectively a visa from the authorities. Before getting this, of course, the authorities need to know why the visit is being made, to where, for how long, etc. Anyone looking at the papers can see how many trips have been made to where, for how long, etc.

Thanks to technology, paper is no longer required for this process — a bit of plastic and a computer terminal or telephone are all that are required. However, the power of anyone in authority to stop anyone in the street and to demand to see their papers is still required.

Eternal vigilance. Where an ID Card system is already in place, if it is not already used as an internal passport, it can easily be adapted for such use. While no Hitler looms on the horizon in Australia at present, the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. Who can foresee five years into the future, let alone 20 or 30 years? And the possible sources of danger are not confined to Australia. How can a country that would have trouble defending itself against a boatload of boy scouts on Botany Bay on a Sunday afternoon afford to be complacent?

Police encounters. If you are stopped by the police in the street today, you do not have to give them your name or address (unless you are driving a car). Unless they have reasonable grounds for suspecting that you have committed a crime, there is nothing they can do if you refuse a request to give them your name. However, most of us do not exercise our right in this regard and usually do supply our names to police when asked. We also usually accede to the almost invariable request that follows: 'Could we see some identification, (please)?', if we happen to have some with us. Because there is no universal identifier at the moment, if we do not happen to have any identification with us, there is nothing the police can do. There is nothing unusual in walking about without any identification.

However, assume that everyone has been issued with an ID Card. If you haven't got your card with you when stopped by the police, imagine the questions: 'Why haven't you got the card with you. Where is it? What are you trying to hide?' Just as the police believe it is reasonable that every car driver should carry a licence when driving a car, so every Australian should carry a card when living. After all, how can they be expected to fight crime effectively when burglars they stop on the streets don't have to show them an ID Card? What have honest people got to fear from such a requirement? Any resemblance that this argument might have to arguments at present supporting ID Cards should, of course, be ignored as being totally coincidental.

Internal passports. Regardless of what the Government says will or will not happen, and what it would like to happen, ID Cards will become de

facto internal passports within a very short space of time if they are introduced into Australia. Administrative convenience for the bureaucracy, the police, shops, banks, and virtually every other type of institution in Australia will ensure that this will happen. You will not even feel comfortable going to the beach unless you have your card with you (remember, some councils employ beach inspectors to safeguard our morals).

Safeguards unenforceable. Proponents of ID Cards argue that the cards would not become internal passports because the Government can legislate to prevent this from happening. Even assuming that effective safeguards could be legislated, there is nothing to stop the Government, or any later Government from removing or changing safeguards whenever it wants.

However, effective safeguards cannot be legislated. For one thing, the people who will be charged with enforcing the safeguards, the police, will be one of the main groups for whom safeguards will be required.

Services denied. Once ID Cards become essential to everyday life, another factor is added to the picture. Without your card you may not be able to get goods and services, use a bank, or take advantage of government services, to name just a few of the inconveniences you may suffer, especially if you move away from your local area. Ultimately, not having your card on you will be sufficient grounds for the police to hold you in prison for 24 hours without charging you, as they can presently do in France, for example. What all this means is that anyone who can take the card away from you will have considerable power over you. Thus, by handing a policeman your card so he can check the details, you place yourself pretty much at his mercy. ('It dropped accidentally through the storm water grill, your Honour.') The same applies to every other person who has a reason for looking at the card, including shop assistants. Similarly, it would not be a good idea to lose your card.

Hassles of getting. The hassles involved in getting your ID Card should also not be forgotten. Present indications are that the process will be even more complicated than the process of getting a passport.

Chapter 8

ID Cards and Strategies for Change

In order to halt the ID Card scheme, PAIN is working in two directions. Firstly, we are publicising and distributing our concerns as quickly and widely as possible and, secondly we are mounting a 'Fill in a Falsie Campaign' as a means of undermining the scheme prior to and immediately on introduction of the cards in 1987. Our campaign needs to be as noisy as possible and we (as the electorate) have to convince the politicians that a grave mistake is about to be made — so here are a few ideas.

Publicity Tactics

These can be undertaken privately or in co-ordination with PAIN. If you are not in a position to join our weekly meetings and you carry out any of the following suggestions, we would appreciate your phoning us to let us know how you have helped, and how useful you found it.

Local and Daily Newspapers: You can write letters to the editor, submit an article or poem, or if you are involved in an organization that is opposed to the scheme you could issue a press release to the dailies explaining your opposition.

Radio: You can ring up talkback programs. The following stations regularly have talkback shows:

- 3RRR FM (419 2066) Survival Talkback — Thursdays 12-2pm;
Street Talk — Wednesdays 4-6pm;
Mating Call — Fridays 12-2am.
- 3CR (419 3877) Youth Radio — Mondays 4.35-6pm.
- 3AW (329 6666) All through the day.
- 3LO (60 0721) Open Mike Program — mornings 9.30-10am.
- 3XY (329 5777) Sundays 8pm.
- 3DB (63 8151) Mornings Mon-Fri

Most of these stations and some others, have talkbacks at irregular times. If you wanted to keep your ears pinned, 3AW, 3CR and 3RRR would be your best bets.

Handouts: The PAIN office can supply you with useful information, leaflets, posters, petitions, sample letters to your local member, badges, stickers which you can take home, to work or to friends.

Letter writing: Politicians usually communicate with their electorates by mail. We need to have their desks covered with PAINful mail. Ask them for their position, tell them yours, ask them to explain to you what they are doing about it.

Although the scheme is a Federal Government initiative, State Governments are still in a position of influence. The following comments were made by the Treasurer Paul Keating on 19 September 1985:

The integrity of the information held on the Central Register will be heavily dependent upon information currently held on State and Territory registries of Births, Deaths and Marriages and the Prime Minister will therefore be writing to State Premiers and the Chief Minister of the Northern Territory to seek their co-operation in making available to the Commonwealth details held by the respective Registries.

A public meeting held in Melbourne on 7 August 1985, and attended by over 300 people, called on the State Government to announce that:

- A/The Victorian Government will publicly oppose the introduction of ID Cards.
- B/No information held by State Government Institutions will be made available to a National Data Linkage System, should one be introduced.
- C/No State Government Instrumentality would be authorized to demand the production of ID Cards, should they be introduced.

This is central to our campaign.

For those who wish to write to parliamentarians, the following is a good list from which to begin:

The Hon, B Hawke (PM), 4 Treasury Place, Melbourne, VIC 3000.

The Hon, N Blewett (Health Minister), Sidney Chambers, City Centre, Elizabeth, SA 5112.

The Hon, Paul Keating (Treasurer), 5th Floor, Compas House, North Terrace, Bankstown, NSW 2200.

The Hon, J Cain (Premier), Suite 2, Balaka Place, Bundoora, VIC 3083.

The Hon, D Chipp (Democrats), Old Customs House, 400 Flinders St, Melbourne, VIC 3000.

The Hon, J Howard (Liberals), Old Customs House, 400 Flinders St, Melbourne, VIC 3000.

The Hon, R J Hawke (PM), 4 Treasury Place, Melbourne, VIC 3000.

Other members of both state and federal parliament can be found in the Victorian and Commonwealth listings in the front of all telephone directories.

Door knocking: Speaking to friends and neighbours is very important. Perhaps you could get some petitions and leaflets from PAIN. Asking people to sign a petition a few days after you have slipped a leaflet into their letter box will have allowed them time to consider the pros and cons of ID Cards.

Meetings: If you want to raise this issue at work, church meetings, union meetings, women's groups, etc, PAIN can help you with material. Raise the issue at your meetings, have it discussed and perhaps pass a motion in opposition to the scheme. Organizations can help us even

further by sending delegates to our weekly meetings, sending donations to help us cover printing and other costs, or by offering to join our volunteer office staff. Some organizations will be in a position to exert some influence over the Government's proposal, eg, The Australian Clerical Officers Association will be significant in convincing the Government, through the ACTU, of the ID Card dangers, and is in a position to generate relevant industrial action if it should decide to do so.

So, as an individual or a group, many methods of 'noise-making' can be used. Concise and clear arguments that reach members of your family, street or local group — all help to generate opinions about the proposed ID Card. Governments often change their minds.

Remember, the Government is supposed to be the servant of the people — it is not supposed to be the other way around.



Chapter 9

False IDs Campaign

This public meeting believes that every Australian who needs an ID number should get at least three or four and preferably hundreds. A 'fill in a false' campaign is launched immediately. People should acquire as many ID records as possible on both Medicare and Taxation computers in order to obtain protection if official ID numbers are launched. Advice and assistance in establishing such records will be available in campaign publication and through a telephone hotline.

This resolution was adopted nearly unanimously on 7 August 1985.

At present it is perfectly legal to use more than one name, as long as it is not done with intent to defraud. A formal 'deed poll' to change one's name is easily done, but not even necessary.

According to official justifications for the Australia Card, some 50,000 illegal immigrants are directly threatened. Hundreds of thousands of others depend on the right to use another name for employment, for escaping from domestic violence, for privacy, etc. This right is especially important to people who face blacklisting or other embarrassment because of some incident in their past.

Criminals are well aware of the methods used to establish false IDs and PAIN is now making the same information widely available to the general public.

If nationally registered ID numbers are required for employment, many thousands of people will have to accept below award wages from employers 'doing them a favour' by employing them illegally, or else pay high black market prices for forged ID.

By establishing multiple identities now, while it is still legal, anyone can automatically obtain multiple Australia Cards if they are issued, since it will be quite impossible to check proof of identity when registering 15 million people.

PAIN does not recommend or condone the use of false ID for any illegal or fraudulent purpose. But the Government may have to think again when it realizes how easy it would be for individuals and small circles of friends to mass produce multiple IDs, all properly registered, and how easily this could result in a serious threat to the Taxation, Social Security, Electoral, Banking and Health Insurance systems.

A 'fill in a false' campaign like that for anti-Vietnam war draft resistance could prevent the Australia Card being launched and would certainly protect many people if it is launched.

Australia Cards would probably be issued automatically to anyone with both a Medicare and a tax file number at the same address. It would be difficult to require birth certificates from millions of people and without co-operation from Queensland or Victoria it will be impossible to check them anyway.

Addresses to receive and answer official correspondence can easily be established using friends to pass on mail. In case of enquiries the friend can simply say someone asked them to collect mail and they haven't been seen since. Use of empty premises, offices of friendly organizations, and commercial re-mailing services have also been suggested.

Medicare provides universal coverage and does not check anyone's ID.

The Tax Department has never knocked back taxes paid by anyone! Many people work under alternative names and receive their annual refunds without any problem. Anyone can pay tax a small business providing services such as home maintenance or gardening for cash and can, at the same time, provide employment for any number of casual employees. Declared incomes can be below, or only marginally above the taxation threshold, to obtain a full refund.

We are preparing a booklet, *How To Get Australian False IDs*, which shows just how easy this is, by reprinting simple forms used by people who have actually done it already, together with the ID documents issued on the strength of these, and notes on how to organize mass production of multiple IDs.

This year's tax returns are due now, so don't wait for the booklet or you may get a penalty for late returns!

Various books listed in our order form have been published by the thriving US false IDs industry in response to the use of US Social Security Numbers for personal identification. PAIN does not endorse their contents but makes them available as a matter of public interest. Items relevant to tax dodging and fraud, etc, demonstrate the irrelevance of ID numbering to prevention of such

activities.

These books are being rushed in by air. If you prefer to wait for substantially lower prices, just send your order form without payment. You will receive a revised pricelist and order form when surface mail stocks are available.

Extracts from these books, notes based on Australian experience and from Australian public enquiry reports, etc, will be included in our photocopy *Australian False IDs Dossier*. Anyone with relevant information, including copies of procedure manuals and forms used in processing any kind of ID-related information, should send this urgently.

Photocopies of our *Australian dSS Dossier on ID Document Checks* are available now as essential reference material for any organization advising its members on these matters. It includes samples of all proof of ID documents accepted by the Department of Social Security from all States, and details of procedures used for checking those (rare) cases where identity is suspect.

These two photocopy dossiers will provide raw material for a second mass distribution booklet: *How To Get Australian Passports, etc.*

This explains the more complex considerations involved where birth certificates are required and

a more secure false ID is needed than the minimum to obtain an Australia Card for employment.

Both dossiers and both booklets will be updated regularly and the mass distribution booklets will be translated into Arabic, Chinese, Croatian, Greek, Italian, Malay, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Serbian, Spanish, Turkish and Vietnamese. (Please get in touch if you can help with translation or distribution.)

Our third booklet will be *How To Disguise for Photo ID*.

Badges imitating (but not forging) the Australia Card design will be available with your choice of photo and details (but they will not resemble the Australia Card). There will be an impressive colour poster showing the various US ID documents obtained by mail order for Gail Citizen (or Roberta J Hawke?) whose photo appears on sample Australia Cards.

If the Australia Card goes ahead, it certainly won't save any tax or reduce social security fraud, but a flourishing false IDs industry could lead to a significant increase in Australia's registered population and a dramatic revival in the small business sector!

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
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
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
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